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Abstract 
In this paper we give some suggestions from etymology on the contrast between Kaplan’s di-
rect reference theory and a neo-Fregean view on indexicals. After a short summary of the phil-
osophical debate on indexicals (§1), we use some remarks about the hidden presence of a 
demonstrative root in all indexicals to derive some provisional doubts concerning Kaplan’s crit-
icism of what he calls “sloppy thinker” (§2). To support those doubts, we will summarize some 
etymological data on the derivation of the so-called “pure indexicals” from an original demon-
strative root (§ 3). The aim of the paper is to consider etymological data as providing evidence 
for alternative theories of language and fostering new directions in linguistic and philosophical 
research on specific topics. 
Keywords: demonstratives . indexicals - etymology - Gottlob Frege - Karl Bühler - David 
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1. Indexicals in the philosophy of language 
Since Kaplan [1979; 1989], Lewis [1980], Evans [1981], philoso-
phers begun to analyse indexicals as a semantic category characterized 
by context dependence1. Philosophers’ indexicals include different syn-
tactic categories (personal pronouns, locative and temporal adverbs, 
!
1 A previous version of this paper has been presented by Carlo Penco at the ECAP 
Conference in Münich 2017. We thank participants for their remarks and criticism. 
We would also like to thank Genoveva Marti and Tim Crane for comments on a pre-
vious version of the talk, Filippo Domaneschi for remarks on the use of data for test-
ing theories, and Massimiliano Vignolo for comments on a previous version of the 
paper. 
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simple and complex demonstratives...) and are characterized in Perry 
[1997] by two parameters: the property of being automatic (or not, that 
is requiring a specific referring intention), and the property of depend-
ing only on narrow context (or not, that is requiring a wide context in-
cluding other features like background assumptions). Philosophers’ 
narrow context is a set of parameters representing what linguists, since 
Bühler [1934] and Fillmore [1997], call «deictic centre»: speaker, loca-
tion, time (and possible world) of the utterance. According to Kaplan’s 
direct reference view, narrow context alone determines the content of 
«pure indexicals»: “I”, “here” and “now” are considered pure indexi-
cals insofar, given a (narrow) context, their character or linguistic 
meaning is a function that automatically gives, as semantic content, 
speaker, time or place of the context of utterance.
Some recent literature (Kripke [2008], Künne [2010], Textor [2015], 
but also Nunberg [2004], De Gaynesford [2006], Elbourne [2008], 
King [2011], Penco [2013], Recanati [2013], Predelli [2013: ch.11], Ki-
jania-Placek [2015]) has also discussed alternative possibilities of treat-
ing indexicals, partly following different interpretations of Frege’s 
1918 remarks on indexicals. Frege’s view on indexicals was discussed 
and rejected by Kaplan [1989] who considers Frege’s ideas similar to 
the idea of a sloppy thinker, who always connects an indexical with a 
demonstrative (e.g. “I” standing for “this speaker). Indeed, some of 
Frege’s remarks suggest a very strict connection between all indexicals 
and a demonstrative aspect, which is denied by Kaplan’s theory in the 
case of “automatic” or “pure” indexicals2. Kaplan’s point can be sum-
marized saying that the sloppy thinker believes that from a privileged 
perspective we may derive a (privileged) perspectival content. Accord-
ing to Kaplan pure indexicals are rigid designators, referring always to 
the same individual in all possible circumstances; he claims that if we 
accept to interpret indexicals as strictly connected with a demonstra-
tive, then they would refer to whatever would be the individual pointed 
at in counterfactual circumstances (if I identify “he” with “that person”, 
!
2 Kaplan [1989: 51]) accepts the Fregean theory of demonstrations, which can ex-
plain the informativeness of sentences like “that [poiting to Venus in the morning sky] 
is identical with that [pointing to Venus in the evening sky]”. This can be explained 
saying that the two occurrences of “that” have the same character but different 
demonstrations attached. However, Kaplan takes the Lewisianinan stance according 
to which demonstrations cannot be part of the syntax because they have no fixed for-
mal structure, and rejects Frege’s theory of demonstratives.  
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the expression “that person” would refer to different persons in differ-
ent circumstances). In what follows I am content to cast a doubt on 
Kaplan’s interpretation of the (Fregean) sloppy thinker and to leave 
open a possibility for interpreting Frege’s view without the shortcom-
ings envisaged by Kaplan. At the same time, I want to point out some 
similarities between Frege’s view and the wiew of his contemporaries, 
like Brugmann and Delbruck, who much influenced the subsequent re-
search on indexicals in linguistics.  
Kaplan [1989] criticises Frege as if he were a “sloppy thinker” who 
interprets indexicals in a sloppy way as they were always connected 
with a demonstratives. But what exactly Kaplan is criticising with the 
tag of “sloppy thinker”? Kaplan’s sloppy thinker erroneously regards 
pure indexicals as synonymous of complex demonstratives:  
[t]he sloppy thinker has adopted a demonstrative theory of indexicals: ‘I’ is syn-
onymous with ‘this person’ [along with an appropriate subjective demonstration], 
‘now’ with ‘this time’, ‘here’ with 'this place’ [each associated with some demonstra-
tion], etc.  
Kaplan has two main arguments against this view: (i) from the point 
of view of the sloppy thinker, the logical behaviour of pure indexicals 
would require a direct acquaintance of the object concerned. To argue 
against this attitude Kaplan makes an example of a kidnapped heiress, 
closed in a trunk of a car, who says “it is calm here now” without 
knowing to what “here” and “now” refer to. (ii) For the sloppy thinker 
the referent of an indexical in conterfactual situations, would be the in-
dividual that would have been demonstrated; if on the contrary indexi-
cals are directly referential devices, the individuals referred to in con-
terfactual situations are the actual demonstrata. The semantic content of 
indexicals is then given by individuals automatically triggered by the 
character in context, and therefore the propositions expressed by sen-
tences with an indexicals (as “I am tired”) are singular propositions 
(composed by an individual and a property, for instance <Carlo Penco, 
being tired>), and they cannot be treated as general propositions com-
posed by a generalized quantifier of the form “[this x speaker x] tired 
x”, as it would be with the sloppy thinker.  
There are possible answers I leave the reader to develop, and I will 
only give two short remarks. Concerning (i) much depends on what we 
mean by “acquaintance”; in fact, I may have no clues of the surround-
!
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ing space and time, but it is reasonanle to think that saying “now” or 
“here” I am acquainted with a particular moment of time and place, alt-
hough I may have no specific information about (like 007 saying to 
Pussy Galore in a famous movie, Goldfinger: “I am happy to be here; 
by the way: where is here?”). We need no specific descriptive content 
for using a demonstrative (this) and an expression of the needed catego-
ry (person, place, time). Aren’t we often in this kind of situation? 
Shouldn’t we say that we have a basic, although limited, acquaintance 
with place and time in the same way we have acquaintance with our-
selves although we might not remember who we are? (think of a mo-
mentary loss of memory)3. Concerning (ii) we may accept the claim 
that indexicals are indicative without being compelled to accept that in-
dexical utterances express singular propositions (Nunberg [1993]). But 
we may also take the general content of the sloppy thinker –dependent 
on the demonstrative – as necessarily equivalent to a singular proposi-
tion that is contingent, in analogy with referential uses of definite de-
scriptions (Vignolo [2001]). 
What lies behind the alternative reading ridiculed by Kaplan? Frege 
dedicated much space in reminding the reader that natural languages 
are much different from formal languages because of the particular 
connection indexicals words have with the context of utterance; sen-
tences containing expressions like “that man” or “I”, “here” or “today” 
cannot express a complete thought, unless we know certain external 
conditions like the speaker’s deictic gestures:  
The mere wording, as it can be preserved in writings, is not the complete expres-
sion of the thought; the knowledge of certain conditions accompanying the utterance, 
which are used as means of expressing the thought, is needed for us to grasp the 
thought correctly. Pointing the finger, hand gestures, glances may belong here too 
(Frege 1918: 64).  
We might see that, contrary to Kaplan’s theory, Frege’s view hints at 
a treatment of all indexicals as something necessarily linked, in analogy 
with demonstratives, to some non-linguistic features, where we may al-
so hypothesize the connection with different modes of presentation giv-
en by different kinds of demonstrations. Frege’s attitude is reminiscent 
!
3 Speaking of the necessity of acquaintance to understand and use indexicals, 
Kripke [2011: 301] insists that «[e]ach of us can fix the reference of the word “I” by 
means of acquaintance with oneself, self-acquaintance».  
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of remarks on demonstratives widely discussed by Brugmann [1904] 
and Bühler [1934], claiming a strict link between indexicals, demon-
stratives and gestures, especially from the point of view of etymology.  
We cannot make appeal to etymological data as an argument decid-
ing in favour of a theoretical claim in the philosophy of language. 
However, also for philosophers, there is something to learn from the 
proper study of the origin of words. Etymological data may give hints 
about the plausibility of some theoretical trends and foster new research 
on alterative paradigms left behind by contemporary standard theories4. 
Partly relying on Bühler’s suggestions, but also on new research 
(among which Dunkel [2014]) we will recall some data that are com-
patible with an origin of our basic indexicals from demonstrative ex-
pressions, especially in Latin and in Greek, but also suggesting a simi-
lar origin at least in most Indo-European languages. The lexicon of 
most contemporary languages still keeps some traces of the demonstra-
tive origin of indexicals and may give some indirect support to the Fre-
gean view on indexicals in natural languages as essentially linked to a 
demonstrative aspect.  
There is also a striking similarity between Frege and ancient lin-
guists like Brugman and Bühler on the role of demonstrations. In the 
paragraph “Indispensibility of deictic clues” Bühler [1934] discusses 
Brugmann’s claim that it is impossible to decide with historical re-
search whether demonstratives were necessarily connected with point-
ing gestures and concludes: 
If […] something more than only the finger gesture is understood by gesture, then 
from a psychological perspetive much more can be decided than only the controversy 
on how it might have been in the beginning. It can be shown how it still is today and 
that it could never have been different. Other optical or acoustic cues can be used in-
stead of the finger gesture, and all of them can be replaced by indirect situational evi-
dence or conventional interpretational clues (Bühler [1934: 112]).  
!
4 It is now common to use psychological data to test the plausibility of a theory; 
however, while pshycological data concern the actual use of language, etymological 
data concern the past; therefore, they cannot directly impinge on our theories of lan-
guage use. However, they may suggest aspects of lexicon that are hidden because of 
language development and, relying on linguistic data from past languages, etymologi-
cal data may be considered analogous to cross-linguistic data (an interesting example 
for our problems is the use of cross-linguistic data by Johnson & Lepore (2002: 24), 
who claim that bare demonstratives and complex demonstratives belong to the same 
semantic category. 
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This reference to the unavoidable presence of a non-linguistic com-
ponent in the interpretation and use of demonstratives is coherent with 
the Fregean suggestion quoted above, which can be summarised saying 
that some expressions do not express a complete sense without the sur-
rounding circumstances and gestures disambiguating the intention of 
the speaker5. Therefore, Frege seems perfectly at home in Bühler’s two-
fields theory, for which «the several modes of perceptual pointing and 
presenting are just as much a part of the essence of natural language as 
abstraction and the conceptual grasp of the world are, and they are 
equally close to the essence of language» (Bühler [1934: v]). Although 
much forgotten by analytic philosophers more strictly interested to the 
logical treatment of model theoretic semantics6, the work of Brugmann 
and Bühler, with its stress on the role of demonstratives and gestures, 
may be a starting point of a new vision of the relation between pure in-
dexicals and demonstratives, which is not far from the Fregean view-
point. 
2. Etymological facts on demonstratives and philosophical suggestions
Which is the relation between philosophers’ indexicals and the ety-
mological analysis of demonstrative as an original linguistic stratum? 
Can we keep the definition of indexicals as simply linked to perspective 
and context dependence or there is some more specific aspect that 
builds them as a linguistic or semantic category? As we will see in § 3, 
etymological studies suggest that all indexicals are linked to a demon-
strative root, maybe including some kinds of explicit demonstrations; 
this link has been partly lost in the development of language, but we 
can find traces of it in the history of the lexical items expressing index-
icals. To put these results in a wider frame we should take into consid-
eration three fundamental aspects of demonstratives:  
  
!
5 Besides his 1918 remarks, Frege discusses complex demonstratives like “that 
man”, saying that “it is the whole consisting of the concept-word together with the 
demonstrative pronoun and accompanying circumstances which has to be understood 
as a proper name”. (Frege 1914, 213; see also Künne 1999, 2010) Complex demon-
stratives are particularly interesting given that they imply both a conceptual and a 
demonstrative aspect, therefore representing the point of connection of the two main 
components of our language capacity, according to Bühler’s two-fields theory. 
6 With the notable exceptions of Mulligan 1997 and Dolcini 2016. 
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(i) The autonomous origin of demonstratives and their link with ges-
tures. Since Brugmann [1904] many scholars (more recently Diessel 
[1999: 150-152]; Himmelmann [1997]; Diessel [2003; 2006]; Dunkel 
[2014: I, 27; II, 685-688]), suggest that demonstratives are an original 
linguistic stratum: there is no evidence that demonstratives developed 
from a non-deictic lexical source, which means that they cannot be 
traced back to other kinds of lexical items. Brugmann [1904: 7-8] even 
claimed that, although no historical research may prove that original 
demonstratives were always accompanied by gestures, it is psychologi-
cally plausible that it is so; in fact, it is easy to imagine the need of joint 
demonstratives and gestures in primitive societies, where indication of 
different locations in surrounding space were essential for hunting and 
other social activities. Some evidence on this direction is suggested by 
Ballester [2006: 23-24] who remarks that demonstratives often do not 
distinguish human and not human while interrogatives do; this differ-
ence seems to imply that demonstratives might have been used in hunt-
ing communities in strict connection with gestures. We still find today 
strict connections between demonstratives and precise gestures of dif-
ferent kinds (including gaze, movements of the lips and whistles) in 
many languages as, for instance, in Melanesian languages (Malherbe 
[1983: 263]).  
With these last remarks, I don’t want to support the revival of ges-
tural protolanguage theories (e.g. Corballis [2002], Arbib [2005]; Arm-
stron-Wilcox [2007]), according to which gestures preceded speech7. 
Rizzolatti-Arbib [1998], trying to interpret the working of mirror neu-
rons, only suggested that gestures contain the seed of syntax, and ex-
periments in psychology tried to interpret gestures as a “living fossil” 
of some earlier communicative stage (Goldin Meadow [2003]). Arbib 
[2005] discussed the hypothesis of a progressive and gradual shift from 
a gestural language to speech, from direct connection to the surround-
ing environment to more arbitrary use of signs. However, even assum-
ing some ground in these hypotheses (but see Fitch [2010: 461 ff.] for a 
criticism), these studies at most reveal the importance of gestures for 
structuring thought. Tomasello claims that pointing gestures, specifical-
!
7 Armstron and Wilcox [2007] suggest a mental experiment reminiscent of Con-
dillac’s: let us imagine a group of children without previous exposure to language; 
how will language develop? Probably beginning with gestures and from those to pair-
ing of gestures and sounds.  
!
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ly the so-called “declarative gestures” where humans point at an object 
while making a request or a report, are what distinguishes humans from 
chimpanzees, which use mostly “imperative” gestures8. Following the 
specificity of human gestures, we are here interested not in the origin of 
gestures as a tool for developing thinking, but in the direct connection 
between gestures and language, that is, the use of gestures in language 
and with language. We are interested in what McNeill et al. [2005] call 
the co-speech gestures, a study of which was widely developed after 
the classic McNeill [1992].  
Psychology helps: according to a well-consolidated view, a central 
moment in child development is the pairing of vocalization and point-
ing gestures, or declarative movements, where the vocal aspect con-
cerns the action and the pointing concerns the object on which the ac-
tion has to be made (like giving or taking)9. We cannot isolate pointing 
with fingers, despite being so relevant for child development, as the on-
ly relevant gestures coupled with language; many studies concern dif-
ferent ways of demonstrating with different bodily movements, like lip 
pointing (see Wilkins [2003]) or gaze or torso orientation (Kita 
[2003a]). Researches on joint attention and deictic gaze have shown 
that these kinds of demonstrations characterize humans also in respect 
of apes (see Kita [2003]; Shepherd [2010]; Moore - Dunham [2014]) 
and are strictly connected with language use.  
Among linguists Diessel [2006] follows this line of interest and 
claims that the role of demonstratives in coordinating joint attention 
suggests to redefine the category of demonstratives: their characteristic 
!
8 Results of ethology seem coherent with linguistic data: according to Tomasello 
[1999], demonstrations seem to be a fundamental stratum of human language, linked 
to what is called “declarative pointing”. While apes learn to use “imperative point-
ing”, they do not seem to master declarative pointing (see also Tomasello - Call 
[2007]; contra see Moore [2016], with a more benevolent view on the use of ostensive 
pointing in great apes). Piovinelli et al. [2003] show that pointing gestures among 
chimpanzees do not combine with direction of gaze or gaze alternation, whereas this 
is typical of children between 9 and 12 months.  
9 E.g. see Brouchon et al. [1986]. We will not deal here with the languages of 
signs, which have their own peculiar problems. It is, however, worth noting that in 
languages of signs interesting distinctions among indexicals are made with different 
kinds of pairings of pointing gestures and gaze. For instance, to distinguish first, sec-
ond and third personal pronouns, the first pronoun points to the signer’s chest; the 
second pronoun points in the same direction as the gaze; the third personal pronoun 
points in a different direction to the gaze (Meurant [2008]). 
!
!
!
THE DEMONSTRATIVE ORIGIN OF INDEXICALS 
145 
feature should be defined as the property of fostering joint attention. 
Using the case of Turkish, where some demonstratives do not have a 
contrastive indication of distance (like “here” vs. “there”, of “this” vs. 
“that”) Diessel suggests that, even when deprived of the aspect of dis-
tance, demonstratives may still keep a fundamental dual property: the 
property of both deixis and joint attention. Therefore, he claims that, 
assuming this restricted definition of demonstratives, we may accept 
the idea that demonstratives are universals across languages.  
(ii) A second aspect, well known among linguists, is the extent to 
which the demonstrative stratum of language has a direct influence on 
other linguistic expressions, first of all philosophers’ indexicals. 
Among philosophers’ indexicals we have pronouns and it is widely 
shared among linguists that demonstratives are the ground for the de-
velopment of pronouns and other kinds of lexical items. This claim 
dates back at least to Brugmann - Delbruck [1911: 311] who assert:  
It may be that all demonstratives were once deictic particles, that it indeclinable 
words. If the object was named at the same time, they took their place in front or be-
hind its designation. Such particles can still often be found in attributive combination 
with nouns in the historical periods of Indo-European languages, for example New 
High German der mensch da (the person there), da der mensch (there, the person), du 
da (you there). Many reasons can be adduced in favour of this origin of the declinable 
pronouns.  
Bühler [1934] is not happy of just saying that pronouns are derived 
from deictic words, as Brugmann claims, but, with his two-field theory, 
suggests a sharper separation between naming words and deictic words, 
with personal pronouns belonging to deictic words (and here philoso-
phers get a point when they classify pronouns inside the semantic cate-
gory of indexicals). The common idea behind the works of Brugmann 
and Bühler is that the basic ostensive-demonstrative linguistic stratum 
is the ground of the development of other linguistic categories. There 
are also contrary views that claim that demonstratives, being grammati-
cal markers, derive from content words (e.g. Heine - Kuteva [2007: 
ch.2]); but there is no particular clear evidence of this last claim as 
Diessel [1999; 2006; and especially 2012] among many others shows. 
It is easy to see clear examples of the derivation of pronouns from 
demonstratives in many Indo-European languages: think of the Latin 
demonstratives “ille” or “illa” and the third person in Spanish (“él”, 
!
!
!
GUIDO BORGHI  -  CARLO PENCO 
146 
!
“ella”) in French (“il”, “elle”) and in many other languages (Ballester 
[2006: 19]; see also Jordàn [1993]; Campbell [2000: 1583s, 1704]; see 
also Traugott [1992] and Diessel [2006: 478]). Generally speaking, be-
sides pronouns and articles, also temporal adverbs, definite and indefi-
nite articles, connectives, and different markers can be shown as de-
rived from demonstrative elements (Diessel [1999: 155])10. We shall 
suggest that demonstratives, being a fundamental linguistic stratum, 
whose roots are not derived from other words, might also be at the 
origin of those “pure” indexicals that Kaplan’s theory tends to detach 
from their particular demonstrative and gestual aspect.  
(iii) A third feature that concerns us is the shrinking of demonstra-
tives in contemporary languages, while, on the other hand, the lexicon 
of content words enlarges. Once a tripartite lexical organization of the 
kind we still find in Dante, Cervantes and Shakespeare was very com-
mon: Questo/Codesto/Quello, Esto/Eso/Aquello or This/Yonder/That
(and, as as Anderson-Keenan [1985] remarks, this tripartition works in 
other languages like the Japanese Kono, Sono, Ano). Traces of this tri-
partite distinction are still present in many languages, their literature 
and sometimes their actual use. The tripartite distinction seems to be a 
replacement for different ostensive gestures, coherent with the positions 
of persons in space, to show what is near to both speaker and hearer 
(this, kono), far from both (that, ano) or near to the hearer and far from 
the speaker (yonder, sono). The binary distinctions like this/that seem 
to derive by cutting the intermediate demonstrative; but we may hy-
pothesise a more ancient and more coherent structure with four demon-
stratives (that is still present, for instance, in Northern Sami): close to 
speaker (proximal), close to hearer (mesioproximal), not so far from 
both (mesiodistal); far from both speaker and hearer (distal). As it is 
well known, many languages have even more than four demonstratives, 
including demonstratives that express both distance and direction, with 
the extreme case of Dyirbal language with eleven demonstratives con-
nected with specification of geographical surrounding regions; and in 
some languages the referential uses of demonstratives require a neces-
!
10 For instance, as Diessel [1999] claims, the English definite article “the” devel-
oped from a demonstrative root in Old English. On the derivation of articles from 
demonstratives see also Leiss [2000: 231]. Diessel [2006: 477] makes the schema 
“deictic > anaphoric > definite”.  
!
!
!
THE DEMONSTRATIVE ORIGIN OF INDEXICALS 
147 
sary accompanying explicit pointing gesture11.  
The shrinking of the numbers of bare demonstratives happens to-
gether with a general widening of the lexicon, coherently with the idea 
that demonstratives form a fixed subset of grammatical markers that 
can shrink and a mobile set of content words that can always enlarge 
(see e.g. Diessel [2006]). The original complexity of demonstratives is 
now lost, but we recover it with mixing them together with content 
words, as we do with “this up here” or “that down there”. But in what is 
lost we may find traces of the strict connection between linguistic ex-
pressions and gestures, and we are driven to better understand the struc-
ture of pure indexicals, as originating in our ability to coordinate ges-
tures and positions in a common space. A reasonable interpretation of 
these data would be to claim that indexicals are de facto hidden com-
plex demonstratives, a mixture of demonstrations and conceptual as-
pects, where demonstrations are not only pointing gestures but also 
other kinds of attention guiding movements. 
Given these three general aspects of the central role of demonstra-
tives and demonstrations discussed in historical linguistics, we are 
driven to rethink the rethoric figure of the sloppy thinker with which 
Kaplan attempted to dismantle Frege’s theory of indexicals. A look into 
etymological data may help us to see whether the sloppy thinker explic-
itly expresses some obliterated features in the development of lan-
guage. 
3. Demonstrative origins of the indexicals  
The main content of this section consists in analysing how much 
“pure indexicals” (I, Here, and Now, with a further example concerning 
Today) are strictly connected to the demonstrative stratum of language, 
so to reveal traces of their possible origins from demonstrative roots.
(i) The “pure” indexical “I” – It is commonly accepted that third 
person pronouns have a demonstrative origin (Bath [2005], Diessel 
!
11 See Diessel [2014: 8-9] quoting Dixon [1972]. See also Hellwig [2003: 263]; 
Senft [2004: 62]. Melanesian languages compose demonstratives with a set of very 
precise gestures, and also whisles; distance and directions are expressed with the help 
of eye movements (Malherbe [1983: 263]). 
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[2006: 478]; for English “he” and “it” Traugott [1992]). But what about 
the first personal pronoun? In what we may reconstruct as the most an-
cient phase of prehistoric Proto-Indo-European, personal pronouns 
were already stabilized. Whether there is a connection with a demon-
strative can only be a suggestion or a hypothesis; eg!, the Latin term 
for “I”, comes from Proto-Indo-European *h1eg" -(h#)oh# or *h1eg" -
(h#)!(h#) (de Vaan [2008: 187]), Greek eg$n derives from *h1eg" -
(h#)óh#-m or *h1eg" -(h#)$(h#)m (Beekes - van Beek [2010: I 373]; on 
Proto-Germanic see Dunkel [2014: I, 109-110]). The conclusion is that 
Proto-Indo-European * h1eg" suffices to give the information of the first 
personal pronoun, and we may only make the hypothesis that the initial 
part (*h1eg" ) of all these forms contains, or derives from, the demonstra-
tive *h1e-, while their final part could be an heir of the demonstrative 
*h1o-.
12 This line of thought had been suggested also by Bühler relying 
on the fact that the origin of the Latin “hic” contains two constituents, 
probably *h%-ke (or *ho-ke or *ha-ke) in Proto-Italic; Bühler also con-
siders a hypothesis suggested by Brugmann according to which 
two transitions are constructed from the deictic word *g" ho, which was obviously 
still undifferentiated, one of which leads to the Greek words &'(, &'(), and Latin ego, 
the other to the *ho- in hic. (Bühler 1934: 109) 
But this hypothesis, suggesting that words for here (hier) and I (Ich) 
may have originated from a common demonstrative root, is a very 
speculative guess on which Bühler elaborates theoretically, given that 
the utterance of “I” and “here” points to the speaker and its position in 
space. Bühler himself considers this hypothesis just as something sug-
gestive and seems to take distance from it, only commenting that both 
hic and ego fulfil the task of positional deixis [1934: 109]. The more 
usual standard vision claims that from *ghe-/*gho- there has been only 
a derivation of the Latin he-/ho-. But we need no further suggestive hy-
pothesis to accept the general idea that even the first person pronouns 
may have a deictic origin; the previous details should constitute a solid 
base, enough to accept the suggestions given by Brugmann and 
Delbrück [1911: 306f] in the following claim: 
!
12 Two variants reconstructed from Old Indic a- that is a demonstrative with the 
meaning of “this”. 
!
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[…] the pronouns of the third person cannot be clearly separated from the demon-
stratives and frequently coincide with them conceptually. (…) But the pronouns I and 
thou, too, seem at least to a certain extent to have been originally demonstratives, in-
asmuch as Greek &*+, [’emo!] (and the like) probably belongs etymologically to-
gether with Old Indian áma-- (this one here).  
This remarks about the first personal pronoun as derived from “this 
one here” gives us further, although not conclusive, evidence that even 
in the case of “I”, the purest of the pure indexicals, there is a strict ety-
mological connection with demonstratives, in analogy with the consoli-
dated view of the demonstrative origin of third person pronouns. 
(ii) Demonstrative origin of “Here” – Something more can be said 
of “here”, especially in its Greek forms. The Greek ént.a, ent.áde 
“here” contains a directive -de (analogous to Proto-Indo-European *d!, 
Proto-Germanic *d! and Old English t!) but it is highly probable that it 
contains also the theme *h1éno- “that” of Greek én% “the day after to-
morrow”, from Proto-Indo-European *h1én-ah/ with an implicit 
*h1ah/mer-ah/ “day”: * h1én-ah/, h1ah/mer-ah/ “that day” (Beekes - 
van Beek [2010: I, 425]).
The final part of the Greek for “here” is compared with the Greek 
it.0gen1s (“noble”) composed by -gen1s (Indo-European, *g" énh1-os-
“birth” = *-g" enh1-1s- at the end of a word), while it.0 contains the 
demonstrative stem *h1i- (in Proto-Indo-European * h1i-s, * h1ei-ah/, 
*h1i-d, whence Latin is, ea, id). The difference between the two terms 
is given by -t.a (with short /a/) in ént.a vs. -t.0- (with long /a/) in 
it.0gen1s. The only way to make the two forms compatible is to recon-
struct *d.-h/ for -t.a and *d.-ah/ for -t.0-. The etymology of ént.a 
should therefore be *h1én-d.-h/, a compound word where *h1én- is the 
demonstrative theme (“that/this”) and *d.-h/ the reference to space: 
“this space” (Beekes - van Beek [2010: I, 582]). 
In general, the locative deictical root *-i- is the common root of 
many locative expressions (Dunkel [2014: I, 126, 133ff]), that supports 
demonstrative expressions, as in Latin. Latin h2c in Old Latin is defined 
as heice, which is the locative case of hic (with short /i/), haec, hoc (the 
three forms of “this” for masculine, feminine and neutral). It is there-
fore directly connected with the basic form of demonstratives (Walde - 
Hofmann [1938: 1644-1645]; de Vaan [2008: 284]).  
English here was in Old English h%r, from Proto-Germanic *h%1r, 
!
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from Proto-Indo-European *k" %i-r, formed on the same demonstrative 
stem *k" ei- “this” which we find in *k" i-h1ah/mero-m (whence Greek 
s1meron, as we will see presenting the etimology of “today”). On the 
English “here” see also Klein [1971²: 343] and Orel [2003: 172]. 
(iii) Demonstrative origin of Now and Today - Latin nunc (“now”) 
can be interpreted as nun-ce, derived from the Proto-Indo-European 
*n34  (with monosyllable lengthening), from *nu-, a form of the root 
*neu- “new” (e. g. in *neu-o-s, whence both English new and Latin 
nouos, later written novus) and the radical *k" e-. This etymology sup-
ports also the Proto-Germanic *nu from which English now derives,
and – according to the two original Proto-Indo-European radicals – we 
may interpret nunc (or “now”) as “this (*k" e-) new (*nu-) [time]” (cf. 
Walde - Hofmann [1938: II, 187-188]; Klein [1971²: 502]).
Latin h!ra is a loan-word from Greek h$r0 “season, year, right mo-
ment”, from Proto-Indo-European *h#yóh1-rah/, and it is probably con-
nected with a demonstrative component (“this season, this right mo-
ment”), as in Italian ora (for “now”) (Beekes - van Beek [2010: II, 
1682]) 
Today is hodi% in Latin and s1meron in Ancient Greek (Attic t1mer-
on, Dorian s04meron). The English term seems linked to a directive 
(Proto-Indo-European *do, which means “towards”) (Klein [1971²: 
769]). The Latin and Greek terms for “Today” are strictly linked to 
demonstratives (Frisk [1973²: II, 894])
Hodie means literally “this day” (ho-di%) and s1meron derives from 
Proto-Indo-European *k" i-h1ah/mero-m which means “this day” (from 
*k" i-, form of the demonstrative stem *k" ei- “this”, and *h1ah/mer-ah/,
continued by Greek h%mér0 “day”13 (Olsen [1999: 176-177], Mar-
tirosyan [2010: 56]). On English today, where we may almost immedi-
ately see the demonstrative origin from “this day” or “toward this day”, 
see Lewis - Short [1879] and Klein [1971:769]. 
4. Conclusions  
We have suggested that three general aspects are relevant in analys-
!
13 Olsen [1999: 176-177]; Martirosyan [2010: 56]. 
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ing pure indexicals as necessarily connected with hidden demonstra-
tives and demonstrations: (i) demonstratives constitute a basic autono-
mous stratum of language use and are essentially connected with ges-
tures (pointing, gaze, position of the body) to foster joint attention; (ii) 
demonstratives are at the origin of many kinds of lexical entries like ar-
ticles and pronouns; (iii) bare demonstratives tend to shrink, so that 
their role is made more and more implicit (e.g. in pronouns and ad-
verbs) as the gestures that accompany them becomes less evident (from 
pointing gestures, to gaze and torso orientation). 
The few remarks summarising some basic results of etymological 
studies concerning pure indexicals show that the development of Indo-
European languages leaves traces of language users very similar to 
Kaplan’s sloppy thinker. In fact, if pure indexicals, as it can be claimed, 
originated by a demonstrative root, we may hypothesize that they are a 
contraction of a demonstrative together with something else, like the 
sloppy thinker according to whom “I” means “this person”, “here” 
means “this place” and “now” means “this present time”, as if indexi-
cals were originally complex demonstratives. Kaplan’s sloppy thinker 
seems therefore to be a metaphor of a possible speaker of the ancient 
times, inventing something new through his ability of pairing demon-
strative (expressed together with some primitive forms of demonstra-
tives) and contentful lexical items (like “one here” or “present time” or 
“space”). Does this mean that speakers of ancient times derived, from 
their perspective, the consequence of a perspectival content? and there-
fore, they were theoretically wrong, and waiting for philosophical clari-
fication? Or should we accept the possibility that “sloppy thinkers” are 
not as sloppy as they seem to be, and the origin of pure indexicals from 
a demontrative root suggests a way of fixing a referent coherent with a 
more Fregean view?  
Actually, we cannot give but speculations, and we may just hypothe-
sise that the progressive hiding of the demonstrative element might 
have been a way to free language from the strict connection with ex-
plicit gestures. Yet, as some authors insisted, we need some non-
linguistic element in the logical treatment of pure indexicals (Burge 
[1979], Kripke [2008], Künne [2010]). We may find in indexicals a strict 
connection with gestures or demonstrations if, following Bühler and Fre-
ge, we do not restrict our attention to explicit pointing gestures: some au-
thors take the uttering itself of the word “I” as a kind of conventional 
demonstration, or attention guiding action, that must be taken into ac-
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count for treating the first person pronoun in its referential use (Künne 
[1992], Nunberg [1993], Textor [2007])14. More generally, following 
Textor [2015], we should distinguish between lexical rules (Kaplan’s 
character) and reference rules, the former expressing what we learn 
when we learn the linguistic meaning of indexicals, the latter express-
ing the procedures we need for correctly using and understanding in-
dexicals. 
At the end of this short excursus in etymology we may only give mere 
suggestions: the etymological inspection hints at the possibility that pure 
indexicals were originally complex demonstratives. This hypothesis does 
not directly provide a direct evidence for endorsing an anti-Kaplanian 
view but it constitutes an evidence for the plausibility of alternative 
views. The problem remains: what happened to such a demonstrative 
component? Did it conflate into the lexical meaning of the pure indexi-
cals and disappeared via a process of conventionalization (Kaplanian 
view) or did it hide under the surface and it is still present in the deep 
logical–syntactic structure of pure indexicals as a hidden index? Only 
linguistic and philosophical arguments can directly address such an issue. 
However, although we cannot derive theoretical conclusions from 
these etymological data, they may boost our effort to look towards re-
covering the implicit demonstrative aspect of the referential use of index-
icals and giving a support to a too easily abandoned Fregean view of in-
dexicals as intrinsically connected with an extra-linguistic component.
These data seem coherent with views according to which pure indexicals 
in their referential use might be considered not “automatic”, as claimed 
by Kaplan, but requiring a supplement from demonstrations (pointing, 
gaze, posture of the body, the uttering itself) that necessarily accompany 
their implicit demonstrative component, devised to produce joint atten-
tion towards the objet, be it a space, a time or a speaker.  
!
14 Textor [2015: 832] puts forward an interesting example: waiting for a unknown 
person in an airport you may hear “I am … I”, where the first token is uttered at the 
phone and the second uttered in front of you by the same person. Considering the ut-
tering of “I” as a kind of demonstration, we would have here two different demonstra-
tions with different cognitive roles. In this case the character of “I” is the same, but – 
to get the cognitive value of the assertion – we need to give due recognition to the two 
different demonstrations. 
!
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